用三个关系式与Mathematica软件求第二类自然数幂和公式

首先介绍三个第二类自然数幂和关系式并对其中的两式给出证明,接着利用这些关系式与数学软件M athem atica4.0,给出求解第二类自然数幂和公式的若干机械计算方法.     

B值随机变量阵列加权和的完全收敛性

设{X_ni:1≤i≤n,n≥1}为行间独立的B值r.v.阵列,g(z)是指数为1/p的正则变化函数,r>0,{ani 1≤t≤n,n≥1}为实数阵列,本文得到了使(?)成立的条件,推广并改进了Stout及Sung等的著名结论.     

On the multidimensional distribution of the subset sum generator of pseudorandom numbers

We show that for a random choice of the parameters, the subset sum pseudorandom number generator produces a sequence of uniformly and independently distributed pseudorandom numbers. The result can be useful for both cryptographic and quasi-Monte Carlo applications and relies on bounds of exponential sums.

     

On an approach to the study of the Jaynes–Cummings sum in quantum optics

A new approach to the study of the Jaynes–Cummings sum, which determines the atomic inversion in quantum model of a single two-level atom interacting with a single mode of the quantized radiation field, based on the number theory theorems on approximation of trigonometric sums is presented.      

非因子化方法研究D~+→ ■~0K~+衰变(英文)

在领头阶和αs 修正阶 ,用QCD因子化方法 ,并对它的软胶子效应用光锥QCD求和规则分析D+ → K0 K+ 衰变过程 ,我们分析发现朴素因子化方法的结果远离实验结果 ,QCD因子化方法结果靠近实验结果 ,但是 ,在QCD因子化方法中 ,若考虑软胶子效应 ,其结果与实验结果相一致 .另外 ,计算发现 ,软胶子效应在该衰变道中有相当大的贡献 ,因此不能被忽略     

独立不同分布随机变盆序列的部分和的增量有多小

关于独立同分布随机变量部分和的增量有多小问题，目前已有了著名的结果.本文通过与独立同分布情形时完全不同的途径，讨论了独立不同分布情形时相应的问题.在矩母函数存在的条件下，获得了与同分布情形相近的结论.     

A BRANCH BOUND METHOD FOR SUBSET SUM PROBLEM

ＡＢＲＡＮＣＨＢＯＵＮＤＭＥＴＨＯＤＦＯＲＳＵＢＳＥＴＳＵＭＰＲＯＢＬＥＭＷＵＳＨＩＱＵＡＮ（吴士泉）（ＩｎｓｔｉｔｕｔｅｏｆＡｐｐｌｉｅｄＭａｔｈｅｍａｔｉｃｓ，ｔｈｅＣｈｉｎｅｓｅＡｃａｄｅｍｙｏｆＳｃｉｅｎｃｅｓ，Ｂｅｉｊｉｎｇ１０００８０，Ｃ...     

关于多元幂级数

引入了多元函数项级数的概念,给出了其收敛域及和函数的定义;通过详实的例子讨论了多元幂级数的收敛域、和函数及多元函数展开为多元幂级数的计算方法.     

L p -dual Quermassintegral sums

In this paper, we first introduce a concept of L _p -dual Quermassintegral sum function of convex bodies and establish the polar projection Minkowski inequality and the polar projection Aleksandrov-Fenchel inequality for L _p -dual Quermassintegral sums. Moreover, by using Lutwak’s width-integral of index i, we establish the L _p -Brunn-Minkowski inequality for the polar mixed projection bodies. As applications, we prove some interrelated results. This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 10271071), Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. Y605065) and Foundation of the Education Department of Zhejiang Province of China (Grant No. 20050392)     

Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace

Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind.